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Abstract 
The present paper considers the neutrality theorem in the presence of public inputs with 
positive spillover effects. Using a model consisting of two countries, two tradable goods, two 
primary factors, and public inputs, the effects of an international transfer taking the form of 
primary factors of production are considered. Warr's neutrality theorem is shown to be 
modified, i.e., whereas total provision of the public inputs is independent of distribution of 
primary factors, the welfare may be changed by the transfer of primary factors. Furthermore, 
the possibility of transfer paradox cannot be ignored. 
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1. Introduction 
In the present paper, the effects of international transfers of factors of production on 
individual welfare and on the provision of an international public input are investigated. In the 
fields of international and public economics, international income transfer in the presence of 
public goods has been considered. 
In his seminal work, Warr (1983) showed that income redistribution among agents does not 
affect the total provision of public goods. This neutrality theorem of public goods has significant 
policy implications with respect to international aid and to interregional income transfer. Ihori 
(1994, 1996) extensively considered the neutrality theorem in the context of the international 
economy. He demonstrated that the transfer paradox may occur if governments provide impure 
public goods. Boadway et al. (1986) considered the effects of interregional income transfer in the 
presence of spillover of public goods and the federal grants system. They argued that the 
neutrality theorem holds in the presence of matching grants by the federal government to 
stimulate the provision of public goods by the local governments. 
This paper differs from the existing literature in two ways. First, the neutrality theorem in 
the presence of public input with positive spillover across countries is considered. Most literature 
dealing with the neutrality theorem has focused on public (consumption) goods. In the real world, 
however, governments provide public inputs such as infrastructures and R&D activities, as well 
as final goods. In the literature of international economics, how the standard trade theory is 
modified in the presence of public inputs has been investigated intensively.1 Tawada and Abe 
(1984), Althenburg (1987), and Ishizawa (1991) have investigated the shape of the production 
possibility frontier in the presence of public input. Kemp and Abe (1994) revealed that if the 
government provides the public input without spillover, international income-transfer improves 
(harms) the welfare of the recipient (donor) country. They also suggested that even if the public 
input is international, the income transfer does not cause transfer paradox. 
Second, the effects of the international transfer taking the form of primary factors are 
considered. International aid to developing countries often takes the form of production factor, 
such as capital goods. In the standard model of voluntary provision of public goods (Warr, 1983; 
Andreoni, 1988; Bergstrom et al., 1986), the income and wealth (factor of production) are 
indistinguishable. In their model, it is assumed that each agent can convert one unit of wealth 
                                                   
1See e.g., Abe (1990). 
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into fixed amounts of private goods. However, even in a simple Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model 
consisting of two goods and two factors, the transfer by the production factor could have a 
different effect than the transfer by income or final goods. Brakman and van Marrewijk (1998) 
considered the welfare consequence of the international transfer of factors of production in the 
absence of public inputs. Their analysis revealed that the transfer of factors of production does 
not cause the paradoxical result if the assumptions made by the standard H-O model are satisfied. 
It will be shown how their results are modified in the presence of the public inputs.2 
The results of the present paper reveal that Warr's conclusion may be partially modified 
when the international public inputs and the transfer of primary factors are considered. Warr's 
theorem is decomposed into two parts, in which (i) the total provision of public goods is 
independent of the distribution of income and (ii) the welfare is independent of the distribution 
of income in the presence of public goods. This distinction is not important as long as the income 
transfer in the presence of public consumption goods is considered. However, as shown in later 
herein, while Warr's first claim is valid under the standard assumption placed in the H-O model 
with public inputs, the second claim does not hold in general. Furthermore, the possibility of 
transfer paradox cannot be ignored. 
In addition, the factor redistribution in the H-O model in the presence of the 
non-contributing country is considered. As reported in Bergstrom et al. (1986), the neutrality 
theorem does not hold in the presence of non-contributors when income redistribution is 
implemented between non-contributors and contributors. In such a situation, Cornes and Sandler 
(2000) and Boadway and Hayashi (1999) demonstrated that the income redistribution from the 
non-contributor to the contributor could improve the welfare in the sense of Pareto. They also 
argued that the possibility of Pareto-improving redistribution increases with the number of 
non-contributors. In the present paper, it will be shown that Pareto-improving redistribution of 
the primary factors is possible, even if only one country is a non-contributor. 
The remainder of the present paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a model that is an 
extended version of the H-O model with public inputs is presented. The effects of the transfer of 
primary factors on the total provision of public inputs and on the welfare under a constant 
consumer price are examined in Section 3. In Section 4, the change in the consumer price due to 
                                                   
2Yano and Nugent (1999) and Schweinberger (2002) considered the welfare effects of the transfer taking the form of 
the factor of production. 
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2. The Model 
2.1. Basic Setup 
The analytical framework is a general equilibrium model of international trade with 
spillover public inputs in which two countries, labeled A and B, produce two tradable private 
goods. In each country, the private goods are produced using two primary factors, labeled 1 and 
2, and public inputs g . The vector of the primary factors employed by private sectors in country 
J is ],[ 21
JPJPJP vvv ≡ , J = A, B.3 The production technology in each private sector, which is 
assumed to be a constant return to scale in primary inputs, is identical across countries. For 
analytical simplicity, the unit cost function of the jth private sector in country J is specified as 
 
,, and ,2,1),(~)(),( BAJjwcgagwc JjjJj ===  
 
where ],[ 21
JJJ www ≡  denotes the vector of the factor prices in country J. In this expression, the 
effect of the public input on the unit cost is represented by 0)( >ga j , where 0)(' <ga j  and 
0)('' >ga j  are assumed. Let good 2 be the numeraire. If both private goods are produced in 




                                                   
3In what follows, for notational simplicity, as long as no confusion arises we do not distinguish column vectors from 
row vectors. 
,),(1 Pgwc J =  (1)
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where P denotes the consumer price. 
The public input produced by the government of country J, which finances via 
residence-based lump-sum tax, is denoted as Jg . Since the public input has a spillover effect, 
each country's contribution to the public inputs can be used in the private sectors in both 
countries: BA ggg += .4 The production technology of the public input is assumed to be a 
constant return to scale in the primary factors. Thus, the unit cost function of the public input in 
country J can be written as )( Jg wc , in which the superscript distinguishing the country is 
omitted because the production technology for the public input is identical among countries. 
From the properties of the unit cost function, )( JgJgw wcwc =  and 
JgJg
w vgc =  hold, where 
0]/,/[ 21 >∂∂∂∂≡
JgJgg
w wcwcc  and ],[ 21
JgJgJg vvv ≡  denote the vector of input coefficient and 
the primary factors used by the government of country J , respectively. 
The two private industries are assumed to have different factor intensities without reversal 
in the primary inputs. From the well-known results on the trade theory, it is shown that the factor 
prices are uniquely determined under the given goods prices and public inputs.5 Thus, the factor 
price vector can be written as a function of P and g as ),( gPww JJ = . Throughout the present 
paper, the factor endowments in both countries shall be assumed to satisfy the following 
assumption. 
 
ASSUMPTION 1: Two tradable private goods are produced in both countries. 
 
Since the production technology is assumed to be identical across the countries, the unit cost 
also becomes the same. That is, ),(),( gPwgPw BA =  holds. This property is known as the 
factor price equalization theorem. Hereafter, in denoting the factor prices, we omit the 
superscript denoting the country. 
Differentiating (1) and (2) and denoting the share of the ith factor reward in the jth sector as 
                                                   
4In the terminology used by Arce and Sandler (2002), the public inputs discussed in the present paper can be 
classified as regional public (intermediate) goods with aggregate technology of summation. 
5For example, see Dixit and Norman (1980). 
,1),(2 =gwc J  (2)
 





































1 θθθθ −=−≡Θ , the sign of which is determined by the difference in the factor 
intensity between the two private sectors. If the first private sector intensively employs the first 














denotes the elasticity of the cost reduction in the jth sector with respect to the public inputs. In 
what follows, this elasticity is referred to as the productivity effects. The impacts of the change in 
public inputs on the factor prices depend on the factor intensity and the productivity effects of 
the public inputs in each industry. In general, the sign of igw  is ambiguous. For analytical 
simplicity, the following property is assumed. 
 
ASSUMPTION 2: Both factor prices are increased with the public inputs, and the following is 
assumed:  
 
.0],[ 21 >≡ ggg www  
 
This assumption is referred to as a natural friend by Ishizawa (1991). As a special case, if 
the productivity effects are symmetric between the two industries, εε =j , ,2,1=j  then (3) 
                                                   






















ww g  (4)
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and (4) can be written as ( ) 0/ >= wgwg ε . For the case in which 21 εε ≠ , the difference in 




















where iigi wgwgw /log/log =∂∂ . From (5), it is shown that by an increase in the public input, 
the price of the factor intensively employed in the sector with high productivity increases at a 
higher rate than the price of the other factor. The reasoning behind the result is straightforward. 
An increase in the public inputs reduces the unit cost in each private sector. Hence, this has the 
same effect as an increase in the consumer price. It can easily be verified that the rate of change 
in the unit cost upon an increase in the public inputs is proportional to the productivity effects in 
the sector.7  Thus, from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, an increase in the public inputs 
increases remarkably the price of the factor that is intensively employed in the sector with high 
productivity effects.  
In summary, the supply side of the model described above is characterized by a restricted 
revenue function ),,( JPJ vgPR  for BAJ ,= . Using the well-known properties the restricted 
revenue function, we obtain wvRvRR JPJJPJJv =∂∂∂∂≡ ]/,/[ 21  and OR
J
vv = . The marginal 
benefit of the public inputs can be represented by JPg
J
g vwR = . Since the factor prices are 
independent of factor endowments, we obtain the change in the marginal benefit of public inputs 
as g
J






gv vRvRR ∂∂∂∂≡ . Thus, for infinitesimal changes in the factor 




















































If the productivity effects are the same between the two industries such as εε =j  for j = 
                                                   
7See Appendix 1. 
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1,2, the above expression can be simplified as ( ) JPJg wdvgdR /ε= . In this situation, the 
marginal benefit of the public inputs changes according to the change in the factor endowments 
measured by the monetary unit. Note that the impact of the change in the factor endowments on 
the marginal benefit depends on which factor is altered. Considering (5), we obtain the following 
property, which has an important implication for the subsequent analysis. 
 
RESULT 1: Assume infinitesimal changes in the factor endowments such as JPii dvw  i=1,2, and 
JPJP dvwdvw 2211 = . The increase in the marginal benefit of public inputs is greater when the 
primary factor that is used intensively in the sector with higher productivity effects is increased. 
 
Proof: The result follows from (5).  
 
The reasoning behind the result is simple. Keeping other items constant, the change in the 
factor endowments alters the outputs in the private sector according to the Rybczynski theorem. 
That is, an increase in a factor endowment increases the output of the sector that uses the factor 
intensively and decreases the output of the other sector. If the primary factor that is transferred is 
used intensively in the sector with relatively high productivity effect, the output of the sector will 
increase. Thus, the marginal benefit of the public input in the economy is increased at a higher 
rate.  
Since the total factor endowment is assumed to be fixed, the resource constraint in country J 
can be written as 
 
,,, BAJgcvv Jgw
JJP =−=  
 
where ],[ 21
JJJ vvv ≡  denotes a vector of the factor endowments in country J. Substituting the 
resource constraint into the restricted revenue function, we have 
 
.,),,,( BAJgcvgPRR Jgw
JJJ =−=  
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Consumer preferences are represented by an expenditure function ),( JJ uPE  for J = A, B, 
where Ju  denotes the utility of country J. For given amounts of public inputs, the 
income-expenditure constraint of the private sector in country J can be written as follows:8 
 
 
In the next subsection, the non-cooperative behavior of governments is considered. 
 
 
2.2. Non-cooperative Behavior of Governments 
The government in each country, which is assumed to be a welfare-maximizer, decides the 
contribution to the public inputs under the Nash conjecture and a given consumer price. 

















Equation (7) states that the marginal benefit of public input should equate to its marginal 
cost. This expression is the same as the Lindahl pricing rule adopted by Altenburg (1987) and 
Abe (1990). However, since the benefit from the public input spills over to other countries, the 
rule described in (7) does not achieve an efficient allocation. 













J wcgwcRR  
                                                   
8In (6), we implicitly assume egalitarian societies. The governments can freely undertake lump-sum transfers within 
the country. 











JJ gwcRcRRdgdR −−=/ . Since the production technology 
.0),,(),( =−− Jgw
JJJJ gcvgPRuPE  (6)
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is satisfied. As discussed in Ishizawa (1991), the second-order condition is concerned with the 
shape of the production possibility frontier. If the second-order condition is satisfied, then the 
production possibility frontier perceived by the government has a negative slope.10 
Before investigating the effects of the transfer of primary factors, the behavior of the 
government is considered. From (7), the optimal response function of the government in country 
J can be written as ),,( JIJJ vPgg ϕ= , I, J = A, B. Differentiating (7), we obtain the slope of 











where IJJI g∂∂≡ /ϕϕ . The sign of (8) is ambiguous in general. As a special case, if the 
productivity effects are symmetric, i.e., )(gj εε =  for j = 1, 2 and its elasticity with respect to 
the public inputs εε /g′  is less than unity, then the optimal response function has a negative 
slope.11 
More generally, in order to determine the sign of (8), a condition corresponding to the 
normality condition in the context of voluntary provision of public goods (e.g., Bergstrom et al., 
1986; Andreoni, 1986) can be used. Suppose that gv  denotes an increase in the primary factors 





g ccv = . Now, define 








                                                                                                                                                                    














v cwccR == . Thus, we obtain (7). 
10Ishizawa (1991) has shown that the Marshalian stability is equivalent to a negatively sloping production possibility 
frontier. 
11See Appendix 2. 
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,,,1]/,/[ 21 BAJwvv gJ
JJJ
v =Λ
−=∂∂∂∂≡ ϕϕϕ  (10)
 
denotes the change in the optimal response function due to the primary factors. Then, we have 
the following property. 
 
RESULT 2: If the marginal propensity to contribute to public input is greater than zero and less 




vg ϕ  
 




I g+−=ϕ  
 
The claim immediately follows from the above equation.  
 
In the literature of voluntary provision of public goods, normality is a sufficient condition to 
ensure the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. However, in the present model, the 
condition of non-specialization must be taken into account. In what follows, it is assumed that a 
unique equilibrium exists and that both countries contribute to the public inputs in the 
equilibrium. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium is written as follows: 
 
.,),,,(~ BAJvvPgg BAJJ ==  (11)
 
Substituting (11) into the income-expenditure constraints, the utility in the Nash equilibrium can 
be written as follows: 
 
.,),,,(~ BAJvvPuu BAJJ ==  (12)
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2.3. Disposable Income in the Equilibrium 
Itaya et al. (1997) have formally proved that the disposable (net) income among contributors 
is equalized under the voluntary provision of public goods. In the model of the present study, if 
the productivity effects are the same between two countries, then the disposable income is 
equalized.12 Noting that wgwg )/(ε=  holds under symmetric productivity effects, we obtain 








Since in an interior equilibrium the marginal benefit becomes equal to the common marginal cost, 
the symmetric productivity effects equalize the disposable income. 
However, if the productivity effects are not the same, the interior Nash equilibrium 
equalizes the marginal benefit but not the disposable income. The following remark confirms this 
result. 
 
RESULT 3: If the productivity effects are not symmetric, then the disposable income in the 
equilibrium is not generally equalized. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 3.  
 
This result suggests that the disposable income, and therefore the welfare, in the Nash 
equilibrium depend on the distribution of the factor endowments. In the next section, the effects 




                                                   
12In the present model, the disposable income is equal to the value of the restricted revenue function. The budget 
constraint of the government in country J is tax revenue = Jg gc . The GDP in country J can be written as 
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3. Transfer of Primary Factors in a Small Open Economy 
In this section, the effects of the transfer of the primary factors in which the consumer price 
is exogenously given are considered. 
 
3.1. Two Contributing Countries 
The analysis is begun under the situation in which there is no non-contributing country. 
Starting from the initial equilibrium, an infinitesimal transfer of the primary factors to country B 
from A, which is denoted as 0],[ 21 >=−==
BA dvdvddd τττ , is considered. Differentiating (7) 
and using (8) and (10), we obtain JJv
IJ
I
J dvdgdg ϕϕ += . Thus, the change in the contribution 














































where 01 >− BA
A
Bϕϕ  follows from the stability condition of the public input game.
13 If each 
primary factor is the natural friend of the public inputs, then the transfer of the primary factors 
increases the supply of public inputs in the recipient country and reduces that in the donor 
country. Intuitively, the transfer of the primary factors to country B from country A induces a 
downward shifting of the optimal response function of A by τϕ dAv−  and an upward shifting of 
the optimal response function of B by τϕ dBv . Thus, we have the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 1: Under a constant consumer price, the transfer of the primary factor does not 
affect the total provision of the public inputs. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                    
JPwvGDP = . Thus, the disposable income is represented as ),,( JPJJPJgJ vgPRwvgcwv ==− . 
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Proof: The claim follows immediately from (13) and (14).  
 
This proposition shows that the first part of the neutrality theorem is relevant for the case in 
which the transfer is made by the primary factors. It is easily shown that the transfer taking the 
form of final goods does not alter the supply of the public inputs in each country.14 
Note that the change in the contribution of the public input may change depending on which 
primary factor is transferred even though the same amounts in terms of the monetary unit are 
transferred. Suppose a transfer of the ith primary factor. From (13) and (14), the change in the 























Taking (5) into account, the above equation indicates that the public inputs provided by the 
donor country are decreased greatly if the primary factor that is used intensively in the high 
productivity sector is transferred. The reasoning behind this result is simple. As shown in Result 
1, the transfer of the primary factor changes the marginal benefit of the public inputs via the 
Rybczynski effects. Reacting to the change in the marginal benefit, each country alters the 
provision of the public inputs according to the first-order condition. 
Next, the national welfare is considered. Differentiating (6), the welfare effects of the 
transfer of the primary factors can be written as IJg
JJJ










u +−=  (15)
and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
13See Appendix 4. 
14Apart from the present model, suppose that the transfer takes the form of final goods. Let JT  denote the 
amounts of transfer. The income expenditure constraint can be written as 0=−− JJJ TRE  for J = A,B and 
0=+ BA TT . Clearly, the first-order condition of the government is not altered, and hence the provision of the 
public inputs is not affected by the income transfer. The welfare effects can be written as JJJu dTduE = . 
 








u −=  (16)
 
In (15) and (16), the first terms of RHS represent the distributive effects that have opposite 
effects on the welfare of two countries. The second terms of RHS in (15) and (16) are reaction 
effects, which also have exactly opposite effects, as shown in Proposition 1. Equations (15) and 
(16) indicate that the transfer of the primary factor has only a distributive effect: the sum of the 
welfare measured in monetary terms, BBu
AA
u udEudE ~~ +  , does not change. Substituting (5) into 




























w cc 12 /  represents the factor intensity in the public sector, we can obtain the condition 
under which the welfare in each country is independent of the distribution of the primary factors. 
 
PROPOSITION 2: Under a constant consumer price, the transfer of primary factor does not 
affect the welfare in each country, if either 
 (i) the productivity effects are symmetric between two private sectors, or 
 (ii) the transfer is made by the same ratio as the factor intensity of the public sector. 
 
Proof: The claim immediately follows from (17).  
 
Condition (i) of Proposition 2 can be intuitively explained as follows. Let ],[ 21 τττ ΔΔ=Δ  
denote the primary factors to be transferred to country B from country A. Equation (13) is 
rewritten as τΔ−=Δ )/( gA cwg  under the condition of εε =j , j = 1,2. Thus, the reduction of 
national income induced by the transfer of primary factors becomes equal to the reduction of the 
cost of providing the public inputs Ag gc Δ . Thus, 0=Δ+Δ−=Δ BAg
AgAA
u gRgcuE . 
Condition (ii) of Proposition 2 is explained as follows. Suppose that the transfer of primary 
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factors to country B from country A can be written as gwcατ =Δ  for 0>α . In this case, 
α−=Δ Ag  holds. Therefore, a decrease in the public input provision releases the primary factor 
by gwcα . The change in the disposable income in country A can be represented as 
)( τΔ−Δ=Δ APA vwR , where APvΔ  represents the change in the primary factor due to the 
change in the public input provision. Since τα Δ==Δ gw
AP cv , neither the disposable income nor 
the welfare change because the transfer maintains constant the primary factors available in the 
private sector. 
Proposition 2 implies that the second claim of the neutrality theorem, which states that the 
welfare is not altered by the income transfer, may hold under certain conditions. However, this is 
not always true. In particular, the possibility of the transfer paradox, in which the transfer of 
primary factors harms the recipient country and benefits the donor country, cannot be ignored. 
The following proposition summarizes the result: 
 
PROPOSITION 3: The transfer of primary factor harms the recipient country and benefits the 
donor country, if the primary factor that is intensively employed in the high-productivity sector is 
transferred beyond the input ratio of the public sector. 
 
Proof: The claim immediately follows from (17).  
 
Proposition 3 is explained as follows. Let ]0,[ 1tΔ=Δτ  denote the vector of the primary 
factors transferred to country B from country A. That is gw
g
w cc 1212 /0/ <=ΔΔ ττ . In the recipient 
country, according to the Rybczynski theorem, the transfer of the first primary factor increases 
the output of the sector that uses the first factor intensively and reduces the output of the other 
sector. As a result, the marginal benefit of the public inputs is increased in the recipient country 
and reduced in the donor country. Thus, the demand of the primary factors for the public inputs 
production is increased in the recipient country and is decreased in the donor country. As shown 
in (13), the transfer of 1tΔ  decreases the provision of the public input in country A by 
 
 







gA Δ−=Δ  
 












































Note that the amounts of both primary factors available in the private sector are affected, 
even though only one of the two primary factors is transferred. Thus, the total effects on 
































































Therefore, 0)(<>Δ AR  if and only if 0)(/)( 21 <>Θ−εε . Based on the definition of Θ , the 
result stated in Proposition 3 is confirmed. 
Proposition 3 suggests that the transfer paradox is not a special case, but generally occurs 
when allowing for the public inputs with spillover and for the transfer of the primary factors. For 
example, let us consider a situation in which each government contributes to the R&D activities 
with spillover, which may be more beneficial in the capital-intensive manufacturing sector. In 
this situation, international aid in the form of capital goods to stimulate the production in the 
manufacturing sector harms the welfare in the recipient country. 
 
 
3.2. Non-contributor and Pareto-improving Redistribution 
Thus far in the analysis, it has been assumed that both countries contribute to the provision 
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of the public inputs. However, by the diversification of the factor endowments, either country 
may become a non-contributor. In this section, the situation in which only one country becomes 
a contributor is considered. Let us assume, without loss of generality, that country A is the 
















where 0>λ  denotes the difference between the marginal benefit and the marginal cost at 
0=Ag . For analytical simplicity, consider an infinitesimal transfer of the primary factors so that 
country A remains the non-contributor after the transfer. As in the previous subsection, 0>τd  
denotes the vector of primary factors transferred to country B from country A. Differentiating 
(18) and (7) for A, we have 
 






gg +−−=  
 
.τϕ ddg Bv
B =  
 
Clearly, the transfer of the primary factors to the contributor from the non-contributor increases 
the provision of public input under Assumption 2, because such a transfer only induces 
upward-shifting of the optimal response function of the contributor. 
Next, the welfare is considered. Since 0=Ag  holds, by differentiating (6) the change in 


















,~ τwdudE BBu =  (20)
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where 0/ <ΛBAgR  follows from the second-order condition. In contrast to the analysis in the 
previous subsection, the transfer of the primary factors may change the sum of the welfare 












Next, the possibility of Pareto-improvement is investigated. In general, a transfer scheme 
that provides Pareto-improvement can be constructed. 
 
PROPOSITION 4: If the productivity effects are not symmetric, 21 εε ≠ , then there exists a 
Pareto-improving redistribution of primary factors. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 5.  
 
This proposition states that the redistribution of primary factors can achieve 
Pareto-improvement in general. This depends on the presence of two primary factors. In this 
situation, the transfer for distributive purpose and the stimulation of public input provision can 
be implemented separately. 
If the productivity effects are the same between the private sectors, the redistribution of 
primary factors cannot be Pareto-improvement under a plausible condition. 
 
COROLLARY 1: Suppose that only one country is a contributor at the initial equilibrium, that 
productivity effects are symmetric, and that the elasticity of productivity effects is less than unity: 
01/ <−′ εε g . Then, there exists no Pareto-improving redistribution of primary factors. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 6.  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, 01/ <−′ εε g  is a sufficient condition for the 
negative slope of the optimal response function. Within the context of the voluntary provision of 
public (consumption) goods, Cornes and Sandler (2000) have argued that if there is only one 
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contributor, there cannot be a Pareto-improving redistribution under the normality assumption. 
The findings described above are consistent with their analysis. However, in the presence of 
asymmetric productivity effects, Proposition 5 implies that the transfer of primary factors 
enables us to improve the welfare of both the non-contributor and the contributor. Indeed, the 
direction of transfer for Pareto-improvement can be found as follows: 
 
COROLLARY 2: Suppose that only one country is a contributor in the initial equilibrium and 
that the productivity effects are not the same across two industries. The following factor 
redistribution, ],[ 21
∗∗∗ = τττ ddd , is always Pareto-improving: 
 






















wwgPd ββδτ  (22)
 






















wwgPd ββδτ  (23)
 










































































The results directly follow from the above equation.  
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Thus, Pareto-improving redistribution of the primary factors increases the provision of public 
inputs.  
This result shows that the transfer of primary factors to be Pareto-improved depends on the 
relative productivity effects and the factor intensity of the private sectors. For example, let us 
consider the transfer scheme leaving the contributor's welfare unchanged. That is, 1=β . If the 
ith factor is intensively used in the high (low) productivity sector, then the ith factor should be 
transferred from (to) the non-contributing country to (from) the contributing country according to 
the rules of (22) and (23). 
One might think that the bilateral transfer of primary factors described as (22) and (23) is not 
feasible. Instead of such scheme, a transfer of the primary factor combined with an income 
transfer can be considered to be Pareto-improving. For example, the contributor receives the first 
factor from country A by 1̂τd . In exchange for this transfer, country B transfers the final goods 
or income to country A by dT . Since the transfer taking the form of final goods does not have 
any effect on the government's behavior, the change in the welfare of each country can be written 





g <Λ+  holds, the transfer of primary factors combined with the transfer of final 








                                                   
15See footnote 13. 
16For example, clean development mechanisms (CDMs) such as support for reforestation to a developing country 
from a developed country may be interpreted as one type of such a scheme. In this situation, the productive use of 
land in the developing country is restricted by the reforestation while the developed country could maintain or 
increase the use of land as a primary factor of production. As a result, the transfer of land is implemented through 
the exchange of income. 
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4. An Extension: Two-country Model 
In this section, a world economy consisting of two countries is considered. As in the 
previous section, it is assumed that taking the prices of the goods as given, each country chooses 
the amount of supply of public input. Such an assumption is consistent with existing literature on 
the trade theory dealing with the public inputs (e.g., Ishizawa, 1991; Kemp and Abe, 1994). Thus, 















J gcvgPRuPEm −−≡  denotes the net demand in country J. Again, it is 
assumed that the equilibrium exists and that both countries produce both private goods and 
contribute to the public inputs at the initial equilibrium. 
Before the investigation in the two-country model, the effects of exogenous change in the 
commodity price on the provision of the public inputs and on the welfare are summarized. From 





21 θθ wwcPwPwwP −Θ=∂∂∂∂≡ , which shows the Stolper-Samuelson 
























































                                                   
17See Appendix 1. 
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In (28), the first term in the brackets on the RHS denotes the terms of trade effects, and the 
second term represents the reaction effects. 
Next, the two-country model is considered. Substituting (11) and (12) into (25), the 
equilibrium price can be written as a function of the factor endowments, such as ),(~ BA vvPP = . 
As in the previous section, 0>τd  denotes the vector of primary factors transferred to country 
B from country A. Thus, the change in the commodity price due to the transfer of the primary 
factors can be represented as τdPPPd AB vv )
~~(~ −= , where ]/,/[~ 21
JJ
v
vPvPP J ∂∂∂∂≡ . 
Differentiating (11) and (12), and using the results in the previous section, the change in the 




























+= −  (30)
 
where JPgd −~  and 
J
Pud −~ , J = A, B denote the changes in the provision of the public inputs and in 
the welfare resulting from the transfer of the primary factors under the constant consumer price, 
respectively.18 By differentiating (25), the change in the commodity price, Pd~ , is given as 
follows19: 
 
                                                   
18In this section, we use slightly different notations to take into account the price change. That is, JPgd −~  in (29) is 
the same as Jgd~  represented in (13) and (14). Similarly, JPud −~  in (30) is the same as 
Jud~  represented in (15) 
and (16). 
19See Appendix 7 for details. 
 



































































































In (31), the sign of PM  is negative due to the stability condition of the international goods 








u udmudm  holds if the marginal propensities to 
consume the non-numeraire goods, Ju
J
Pu EPE / , are the same between the two countries. Hence, 
the following Lemma is obtained: 
 
LEMMA1: In the two-country model, the transfer of primary factors does not alter the price, if 
at least one of the following conditions is satisfied: 
 (i) the productivity effects are the same between two sectors, 
 (ii) the transfer ratio is the same as the factor intensity of the public sector, 
 (iii) the marginal propensity to consume is the same between the two countries. 
                                                   
20See Appendix 7. 
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Proof: If condition (i) or (ii) is met, BAJud JP ,,0~ ==−  follows from Proposition 2. Under 




uBAJ udE  follows from (17). Hence, 0
~ =Pd  holds under condition (i), 
(ii), or (iii).  
 
When the consumer price does not change, with the exception of the demand side of the 
economy, the results obtained in the previous section can be applied. Directly from Lemma 1, the 
neutrality theorem for an economy consisting of large countries is established. 
 
PROPOSITION 5: In the two-country model, the transfer of the primary factors does not affect 
the total supply of the public inputs, if at least one of the following conditions is satisfied: 
 (i) the productivity effects are the same between the two private sectors, 
 (ii) the transfer ratio is the same as factor intensity of the public sector, 
 (iii) the marginal propensities to consume are the same between the two countries. 
 
Proof: The claim immediately follows from Proposition 1 and Lemma 1.  
 
If either condition (i) or condition (ii) is satisfied, the disposable income in each country is 




u udE  for J = A,B. Thus, the neutrality theorem is valid 
regardless of the demand side of the economy. On the other hand, if the consumer behavior is the 
same between the two countries in the sense of condition (iii) of Proposition 5, the neutrality 
theorem is valid without additional restriction to Proposition 2 on the supply side. 
Together with (30), Proposition 2, and Proposition 5, the welfare effects of the transfer are 
obtained as follows: 
 
PROPOSITION 6: In the two-country model, the transfer of primary factor does not alter the 
welfare in each country, if at least one of the following conditions is satisfied: 
 (i) the productivity effects are the same between the two private sectors. 
 (ii) the transfer ratio is the same as the factor intensity of the public input. 
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Proof: The claim immediately follows from Proposition 2 and Lemma 1.  
 
If the conditions described above are not met, Proposition 3 concerning small countries is 
valid under the following condition: 
 
PROPOSITION 7: In the two-country model, if the marginal propensities to consume are the 
same between the two countries, then the results stated in Proposition 3 are valid. 
 
Proof: The claim immediately follows from Proposition 3 and Lemma 1.  
 
Proposition 7 states that, with the exception of the initial factor endowments, the 
paradoxical results cannot be ignored even if the two countries are identical. As suggested in 
Kemp and Abe (1994), if the transfer takes the form of income or final goods, the transfer 
paradox does not occur even in the presence of spillover public inputs. In this situation, no 
government has an incentive to alter its contribution to the public inputs because its revenue 
function to be maximized is the same regardless of income transfer. In the case of the transfer of 
the primary factor, paradoxical results cannot be ignored because the governments react to the 
changes in the factor endowments by adjusting the provision of public inputs. 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In the present paper, the relationship between the non-cooperative provision of public input 
with spillover and the factor endowments has been considered. In order to analyze the effect of 
the transfer of primary factors, a trade model consisting of two goods, two factors, and public 
input was employed. Using this model, not only the effects on the provision of the public inputs 
but also the effects on the production of the private goods through the Rybczynski effects were 
considered. 
The results of the present study show that the neutrality theorem obtained by Warr (1983) is 
partially modified when the spillover public inputs and the transfer of primary factors are taken 
into account. That is, unlike the standard model of voluntary provision of public goods, the 
transfer of primary factor may change the resources that are available in the private sector. 
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Consequently, depending on the factor intensities in the private and public sectors and on the 
differentials in the productivity effects of public inputs between private sectors, the level of net 
national income is affected by the transfer of the primary factors. In particular, the transfer 
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Appendices 
A.1. Derivation of (3) 
















































































wi wcc ∂∂≡ /  and )(/)()()(~)( gawcgawcgac
jjjjj
g
′′ == . The inverse of the 
























































































Using (A2), we obtain (3), (4), and Pw . From (A1), the change in unit cost of the jth sector due 
to an increase in the public inputs can be written as )/( gdgcdc jjj ε−= . Therefore, the rate of 
change in the unit cost due to the change in the public inputs is proportional to the productivity 
effects, i.e., )/(/ gdgcdc jjj ε−=  holds for 2,1=j . 
 
 
A.2. Slope of the Optimal Response Function under the Symmetric Productivity 
Effects 
Suppose that εε =j , 2,1=j . Then, ( )wgwg /ε=  and 
 
 






















and ( ) ggwg cgcw /ε= . Furthermore, 0=Jggwwg gwcw  due to the homogeneity in w  of the unit 















































I . As specified 
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A.3. Proof of Result 3 
In the equilibrium, Bg
A
g RR =  holds. Thus, if and only if there exists 0>ρ  such that 
J
g













J vwwvwwRR ρρρ −+−=−  (A7)
 
Thus, 0=− Jg










































The determinant of the system is given by ))(( 21211221 gg
BPAPBPAP wwwwvvvv −− . Thus, as long as 
)/()/( 2121
BPBPAPAP vvvv ≠ , there exists no ρ  that satisfies 0=− Jg





















A.4. Stability Condition for the Public Input Game 
Let us consider the public input game characterized by )( IJJ gg ϕ=  under a constant 






t gg ϕ=  (A9)
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for I,J = A,B, where t  indicates the time period. A linear approximation of the adjustment 













t ggg )()(  and 
∗Jg  denotes the equilibrium value. The stability condition of this 




B gg ϕϕ  
 
Thus, 01 >− BA
A
Bϕϕ  follows from the stability condition. From (8), it is easily verified that 
0≠g
g
w wc  is a necessary condition for the stability. 
 
 
A.5. Proof of Proposition 4 












































Applying Gordan's Theorem of Alternative (see Mangasarian, 1969) to (A11), 0>AAu duE  and 
0>BBu duE  can be shown to be feasible if and only if 
 

















does not have a solution 0≥x . The determinant of the system can be written as 
 
 










































wwwwww gg  
 
holds, (A12) does not have a non-trivial solution.  
 
 
A.6. Proof of Corollary 1 



















































for i = 1, 2. Since country A is the non-contributor, Bg
gA
g RgPcR =< ),(  holds in the initial 
equilibrium. Thus, if the elasticity of the productivity effects is less than unity, we obtain  
 

















































Here, (A16) can easily be verified to have a solution such as 0]1,/1[],[ 21 >= qxx . Applying 
Gordan's Theorem to (23), the statement can be confirmed.  
 
 
A.7. Warlasian Stability of the Goods Market 
Let us consider the condition for stability under the process in which the contribution of the 
public inputs is adjusted by the change in the consumer price. Substituting (11) and (12) into (25), 
the world excess demand can be written as a function of the consumer price and the factor 














ttt vvPMPP −− =− σ  (A18)
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where σ  denotes the adjustment speed. The linear approximation of the above process around 
the equilibrium price of ∗P  can be written as follows: 
 
,)1( )1()( −
∗ Δ+=Δ tPt PMP σ  (A19)
 






































Thus, 0<∗PM  is a necessary condition for stability. This stability condition means that the 
slope of the aggregate demand curve is steeper than that of the aggregate supply curve. One more 
interpretation of this stability condition is that the condition represents the multiplier of the 
feedback effect induced by the initial impact on the goods market. Based on the properties of the 
excess demand function and the concavity of the unit cost function, JPBAJ m∑ = , , becomes 
negative. Thus, the condition is equivalent to ( ) 01 ~~, >+∑− ∂∂∂∂∂= PggdPPududPBAJ IIJJ , which requires 
convergence of the feedback effect.  












































































































and J BJ A gBAJgBAJg mmm ∑=∑≡ == ,, . Next, consider the transfer of primary factors from country A 
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denote the change in the provision of the public inputs and in the welfare under a constant 
consumer price. Note that 0)( =− τdmm Bv
A














A gggg mmmm +=+ , (A21) can be simplified as 
∑∑ = −= − +=− BAJ JPgBAJ JPJuP gdmudmPdM ,, ~~
~ . In addition, since Proposition 1 states that 
0~
,
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